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FORMALIZING DARWINISM, NATURALIZING MATHEMATICS 
 
 
 
1. Evolutionism and Mathematics 
 
In the last decades two different and apparently unrelated lines of 
research have increasingly connected mathematics and evolutionism. 
Indeed, on the one hand, different attempts to formalize Darwinism have 
been made (see for a survey Barberousse and Samadi, 2015; Thompson, 
2007), while, on the other hand, different attempts to naturalize logic and 
mathematics have been put forward (see for a survey Dutilh Novaes, 2012; 
Van Kerkhove, 2006). 
The works of the scientists who have tried to shed light on the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying human reasoning and the evolutionary roots of our 
cognitive abilities (e.g. Dehaene et al. 2005), and the work of the 
mathematicians who have tried to construct more and more sophisticated 
mathematical models of the evolutionary processes (e.g. Batty et al. 2014), 
have stimulated interesting philosophical reflections in the fields of 
philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of biology. 
These researches may appear either completely distinct or at least in 
some way convergent. They may in fact be seen as both supporting a 
naturalistic stance. Evolutionism is indeed crucial for a naturalistic 
perspective, and formalizing it seems to be a way to strengthen its 
scientificity and make biology more akin to the “hardest” sciences. This 
would allow evolutionism to better resist the attacks of the anti-naturalists. 
With regard to the researches devoted to showing how mathematics and 
logic are related to our biological features, given that mathematics and 
logic have been so long (and often are still) considered as unrelated to our 
human bodily constitution, and given their centrality for science, these 
attempts may even more easily be seen as connected to a naturalistic view. 
On the contrary, in what follows we will underline some of the 
difficulties that such lines of research have to face. These difficulties lay in 
the possibility that the conception of knowledge on which they rest may be 
undermined by the consequences of accepting an evolutionary perspective. 
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1.2. Formalizing Darwinism 
 
The numerous attempts to formalize Darwinism which have been put 
forward may be better understood considering the prominence of 
evolutionism in biology, and the paucity (if not the absence) of laws in 
biology, which has often been intended as a lack of rigorousness and 
reliability of such science. 
Indeed, according «to most evolutionary biologists and philosophers of 
biology, the theory of evolution provides theoretical foundations, as well as 
conceptual unity, to all other domains of biology», but despite «their 
importance, the principles of evolutionary theory have seldom been 
explicitly formulated» (Barberousse and Samadi, 2015, pp. 229-230). 
For example, Chaitin states that «it is a mathematical scandal that we do 
not have a proof that Darwinian evolution works» (Chaitin, 2012, p. 53). 
Biology may in fact be defined an “inexact science” to the extent it is 
not “mathematical” or “mathematized”. This is due to the fact that «since 
mathematics is often understood as (...) an exact science, the use of 
mathematics to specify or represent a scientific theory is one way to 
interpret a science as “exact”. (…). Thus, non-mathematical (or as yet un-
mathematized) biological sciences are inexact sciences» (Griesemer, 2013, 
p. 298). 
The Darwinian core of evolutionism, i.e. the relevance and functioning 
of natural selection, was unsatisfactorily formulated and gave rise to many 
controversies. Thus, many have tried to formalize Darwinism «to provide a 
non-ambiguous non-tautologous translation of “survival of the fittest”» 
(Williams, 1973, p. 84). 
Different authors try to prove the correctness of Darwinism in different 
ways: by giving a formalization of Darwin’s arguments (Tennant, 2014); 
by constructing a mathematical argument aimed at showing that some core 
tenets of Darwinism may be formally proved (Chaitin, 2012); by 
mathematically representing the main evolutionary processes (Ao, 2005); 
or by showing that if biology is full of mathematical models which work 
and are built relying on Darwinism, this must mean that the distance of 
biology from physics with respect to the possibility of finding laws of 
nature is just «one of degrees, and not of kind» (Dorato, 2012, p. 109). 
Formalizing Darwinism is aimed at strengthening it and at trying to 
make biology more akin to the “hardest” sciences. For example, Grafen 
states that: 
 
theories in physics are usually expressed in mathematics. Newton’s mechanics 
and Einstein’s theory of special relativity are essentially equations. Words are 
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needed to interpret the terms, but only for that. Darwin’s theory of evolution by 
natural selection has obstinately remained in words since 1859. Of course, there are 
many mathematical models that show natural selection at work, but they are all 
examples. None claims to capture Darwin’s central argument in its entirety 
(Grafen, 2007, p. 1243). 
 
Similarly, Chaitin states that there «is empirical evidence in favor of 
Darwin’s theory, but there is no mathematical proof. (…). If Darwin’s 
theory is as fundamental as biologists think, then there ought to be a 
general, abstract mathematical theory of evolution that captures the essence 
of Darwin’s theory and develops it mathematically» (Chaitin, 2012, p. 9). 
 
 
1.3. The Formal Darwinism Project 
 
To give just an example of one of the attempts to formalize Darwinism, 
we will briefly (and roughly) sketch the main lines of the Formal 
Darwinism Project (FDP) proposed and developed by Grafen (2014, 2007, 
2002; Batty et al. 2014). 
The Darwinian theory is considered to have «to explain two sets of 
phenomena: the organisms’ adaptations and the transformations undergone 
by biological diversity over time» (Barberousse and Samadi, 2015, p. 232).   
The first set of phenomena is usually modeled using optimality models, 
which indicate how fitness is maximized by an adaptive trait, while the 
second set of phenomena is modeled using population genetics models, 
which indicate how the gene frequencies change under the effect of natural 
selection. The problem is that such kinds of models differ on a crucial 
respect: population genetics models do not indicate that fitness is 
necessarily maximized (Grafen, 2014). 
FDP is a debated (and rather controversial) attempt to construct a 
mathematical bridge between those two ways of studying natural selection. 
Indeed, Grafen tries to prove that such approaches may be unified in 
order to secure what he consider to be the core of the Darwinian approach, 
i.e. the thesis that natural selection is the only relevant factor of evolution, 
and that this (roughly) means that fitness, on average, tends to increase. 
For example, Grafen (2002) tries to show that for each population 
genetic model satisfying certain conditions, exists a corresponding 
optimality model of a specific kind. And the importance of the existence of 
this corresponding optimality model lies exactly in that «it provides an 
interpretation of some aspects of the population genetic model in optimality 
terms» (Grafen, 2002, p. 88). 
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One of the key assumptions of such a view is the claim that natural 
selection has a prominent role in evolution, i.e. adaptationism (Orzack and 
Forber, 2010). Adaptationism is a very debated view, and it has been 
fiercely criticized. But neither such well known criticisms, nor the 
mathematical details of FDP are relevant here. What is worth noticing is 
that Grafen searches for a confirmation of his view exclusively in some 
“formal” result: a «formal justification for» this kind of adaptationism «lies 
in the isomorphism between the dynamics of natural selection and an 
optimization program that captures the idea of the organism as striving to 
maximize her fitness» (Gardner, 2013, p. 791).  
 
 
1.4. The Epistemological Shortcomings of Mathematization 
 
Any attempt to formalize some empirical domain may face different, 
and well known, epistemological risks. 
One of such risks is that of mistaking a mathematical model for the 
reality itself. For example, Cellucci states that to «claim that the laws of 
nature or the mathematics used in formulating them exist in the world is to 
confuse the tools by which humans make the world comprehensible to 
themselves with the world itself» (Cellucci, forthcoming, p. 9). 
Moreover, in searching for a model, we tend to oversimplify the 
phenomenon we are modeling in order to be able to manage it from a 
computational point of view. For example, Chaitin states that what he calls 
“metabiology” has to be «a highly simplified version of real biology», 
because otherwise he «wouldn’t be able to prove any theorems» (Chaitin, 
2012, p. 4). 
Finally, focusing on mathematized models may lead us to neglect 
important aspects of the phenomenon we are investigating. For example, 
Schwartz states that «the mathematical-intellectual effort of applying» the 
formalized theory with which we deal, «fixes in us» that «particular point 
of view, making us blind to whatever appears neither as a dependent nor as 
an independent parameter in its mathematical formulation». Thus, «the 
mathematical formalism may be hiding as much as it reveals» (Schwartz, 
2008, pp. 22-25). 
Despite the relevance of these issues, in what follows we will instead 
focus only on the peculiar challenges which derive from the attempts to 
formalize Darwinism for a naturalistic perspective on knowledge. 
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2. Formalizing and Naturalism 
 
The main idea behind the attempts to formalize Darwinism is that our 
knowledge is strengthened if it is presented in an axiomatic and deductive 
way, i.e. if we can isolate some few principles and deductively derive from 
them all our knowledge in some field. Moreover, there is the underlying 
conviction that a mathematical model may be isomorphic to the dynamics 
of the phenomenon it models, so that if we could establish a mathematical 
result relative to such model, this will increase our insight on the 
phenomenon we are investigating. 
These issues put in relation the attempts to formalize Darwinism to the 
debate over naturalism. Indeed, evolution is central to naturalism. For 
example, Giere states that if «evolutionary naturalism is understood to be a 
general naturalism informed by the facts of evolution and by evolutionary 
theory, then no responsible contemporary naturalist could fail to be an 
evolutionary naturalist in this modest sense» (Giere, 2006, p. 53). 
Thus, strengthening Darwinism seems, prima facie, a way to support a 
naturalistic stance. But if such strengthening is pursued through 
formalization, and if what we think formalization is is related to what we 
think mathematics is, then we have to confront with the issue of giving a 
naturalistic account of mathematics, in order to maintain a naturalistic view 
of knowledge. 
Indeed, many authors think that «mathematics is an enormous Trojan 
Horse sitting firmly in the center of the citadel of naturalism», because even 
if «natural science is mathematical through and through», mathematics 
seems to «provide a counterexample both to methodological and to 
ontological naturalism». In fact, mathematics ultimately rests on axioms, 
which are «traditionally held to be known a priori, in some accounts by 
virtue of a form of intuitive awareness». The epistemic role of the axioms 
in mathematics seems «uncomfortably close to that played by the insights 
of a mystic. When we turn to ontology, matters are, if anything, worse: 
mathematical entities, as traditionally construed, do not even exist in time, 
never mind space» (Weir, 2005, pp. 461-462). 
In order to avoid to be forced to draw anti-naturalist conclusions, the 
point is not to dismiss the attempts to formalize Darwinism, but rather to 
scrutinize the mainstream view on formalization, and try to rethink the 
traditional claims on mathematics and knowledge on which such view is 
based. 
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2.1. Formalizing and Platonism 
 
It is thus relevant to analyse more precisely what does it mean “to 
formalize” and its relationship with mathematics. 
According to Dutilh Novaes (2012) “to formalize” refers mainly to two 
related concepts: 1) de-semantification, and 2) being computable. 
1) “De-semantification” refers to the idea of creating a set of symbols 
which conveys no meaning, performing an «abstraction from all meaning 
whatsoever» (Dutilh Novaes, 2012, p. 13). 
2) “Being computable” refers to the idea that such symbols may be 
mechanically manipulated according to certain completely specified rules, 
so that starting from an initial state, after a finite number of discrete steps, a 
final state is reached. 
There is a clear homogeneity in this view between logic, mathematics 
and formal languages: a «logic can be formulated in an axiomatic form 
with a very minimal set of rules of transformation (typically, only modus 
ponens), or these very axioms can be formulated as rules of 
transformation» (Ibidem, p. 59), while a formal language is normally 
conceived of as a mathematical object, whose properties can be 
mathematically investigated. Indeed, the concept of «formal language is a 
mathematically well-defined concept with precise borders. A structure is a 
formal language iff it is defined by a finite collection of symbols and rules 
of formation which determine exactly what is to count as a permissible 
combination of symbols» (Ibidem, p. 58). 
Thus, the characteristic features of mathematics, logic, and formal 
languages are those of being axiomatic deductive closed symbolic systems. 
This view is at odds with a naturalist stance, because the way in which it 
defines mathematics and logic makes impossible to naturalistically account 
for our ability in producing and using such abstract devices (Cellucci, 
2013a, 2013b). Indeed, Dutilh Novaes also considers formal languages a 
“technology”, i.e. something which can be used to solve practical problems. 
More specifically, she thinks that formal languages may be considered as: 
1) a tool to model empirical phenomena; 2) a de-biasing tool for improving 
our reasoning. 
This approach to formalization raises at least two main questions. 
1) With regard to the issue of modeling empirical phenomena, there is 
the problem of the applicability of such “formal devices” to the world, i.e. 
the problem of explaining their efficacy in solving practical problems if, as 
stated above, to be formal means to be deprived of “whatsoever meaning”. 
This problem is equivalent to the very well known problem of explaining 
the applicability and the efficacy of mathematics to the world (for a survey 
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see Jacquette, 2012). In fact, it is precisely for their abstractness and 
computability that such “formal devices” may be considered as 
mathematical objects. 
But if logic and formal languages are abstract in the same way in which 
mathematics is traditionally considered to be abstract, then we cannot adopt 
a realist stance towards them for the same reason we cannot easily defend a 
realist position in mathematics if we want to adopt a naturalistic stance. 
Indeed, Mathematical Platonism (MP), the most widespread realist position 
in philosophy of mathematics (Balaguer, 2009), is considered to be unable 
to naturalistically account for our reliability about mathematics (Steiner, 
1998). MP is the claim that mind-independent mathematical abstract 
entities exist. MP’s main argument, the Indispensability Argument (IA), 
claims that the indispensable role of mathematics in scientific theories 
justifies the realist’s claim about the ontological status of mathematical 
entities.  
The problem is that MP cannot account naturalistically for the capability 
of humans to grasp mathematics. For example, Brown admits that he has 
«no idea how the mind is able to “grasp” or “perceive” mathematical 
objects and mathematical facts», but that he nevertheless is certain that it 
«is not by means of some efficient cause» (Brown, 2012, p. 12). 
2) With regard to the de-biasing role of formal languages, there is the 
problem of linking the improvement of our cognitive abilities due to the use 
of formal languages with their evolutionary roots. 
In fact, the mainstream (metaphysical) view in philosophy of science is 
Scientific Realism (SR), which claims that our best scientific theories are 
true, and that we can infer their truth from their empirical success (Psillos, 
1999). The most shared view of truth among the realists is that of truth as 
correspondence
1
. For example, Sankey states that: «correspondence 
theories which treat truth as a relation between language and reality are the 
only theories of truth compatible with realism» (Sankey, 2008, p. 17). 
Moreover, many realists view themselves as naturalists, and thus should 
commit themselves with evolutionism. 
If we take our best theories to be true, then it is obvious to measure the 
distance from the truth referring to such theory. 
 
1 The realism/anti-realism debate is so wide that it is impossible to account for all the 
realist positions which have been elaborated, so in what follows we will concentrate on what 
can be labeled a “standard” realist position. Analogously, many positions have been 
elaborated on the issue of truth (see for a survey Burgess and Burgess, 2011). Thus, even if 
truth as correspondence seems to be the most widespread view among the realists, not any 
realist adopts such view. Here we will focus on correspondence, but some of the objections 
we will deal with can be formulated even with respect to other conceptions of truth. 
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With regard to human reasoning, normally the experiments designed to 
measure our logical abilities have confronted the performances by some 
humans with the answers which were considered correct according to the 
theories elaborated by logicians, thus drawing the conclusion that our 
reasoning performances are deeply biased, and so that normally they are 
not reliable in attaining the truth (e.g. Nisbett and Ross, 1980). 
Taking the very same theories we try to naturalize as true, because they 
are our best theories, i.e. the most successful, raises two main problems. 
a) If our individual performances are so deeply biased, how can we 
come to elaborate a correct logical theory? In other words, given that the 
correct answers prescribed by the theory are considered to be true, because 
they are successful in dealing with the world, how can we reach knowledge 
of such truths, if, according to naturalism, our knowledge has to be put in 
relation to our evolved cognitive abilities, and scientific investigations tell 
us that such evolved cognitive abilities are unreliable? 
The standard answer is: “culturally”. For example, Dutilh Novaes 
argues that it is incorrect to try to find in our brains some encoded module 
for the elaboration of formal languages and deductive techniques, because 
such high level achievements may be seen as reachable only culturally. 
They are not “innate”. They have to be in some way instructed by 
modifying through training those natural tendencies of thought which we 
can observe to be normally biased: «it is a mistake to look for deduction 
(…) in humans’ spontaneous reasoning patterns, grounded in their 
biologically determined cognitive apparatus. Rather, I shall argue that 
deduction in fact corresponds to a method of reasoning and arguing 
developed specifically to be used in scientific inquiry; it is, in other words, 
a cultural product» (Dutilh Novaes, 2012, p. 148). 
But in the meantime, these modifications have to be possible in relation 
to our biological constitution: «even if specific training is required, 
deductive reasoning is something that at least some of us humans do do, at 
least in some circumstances. So obviously, it must be grounded in cognitive 
possibilities that are available in humans from the start» (Ibidem, p. 148). 
But how can we judge the correctness of the inferential steps and 
inferential rules that we perform when we are trained to do so? This is the 
problem of justifying the validity of logic. The problem of justifying our 
reliability about logic is analogous to that of justifying our reliability about 
mathematics (Schechter, 2010). How can we account for the reliability of 
mathematics and logic if we accept the idea that they are both produced by 
humans and humans are evolved organisms? There is no clear answer to 
this question (Pelletier, Elio and Hanson, 2008). 
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For example, Kyburg states that «our justification of deductive rules 
must ultimately rest, in part, on an element of deductive intuition: we see 
that MP is truth-preserving − this is simply the same as to reflect on it and 
fail to see how it can lead us astray» (Kyburg, 1965, p. 276). But there is no 
clear explanation of what such sort of “intuition” may be, and why it should 
be reliable. 
On the other hand, Enoch and Schechter state that we are justified in 
employing the rules of inference and other belief-forming methods that we 
have to employ indispensably «for successfully engaging in some 
extremely important projects» (Enoch and Schechter, 2008, p. 553), i.e. 
they claim that the success justifies our inferences. But this argument does 
not show that our successful inferences “track the truth”, unless we accept 
the assumption that “only the truth can lead to success”. 
In any case, relying on intuition and success seems the most widespread 
line of reasoning to justify the ability of our inferences to track the truth. 
Below we will highlight some of the difficulties that affect such approaches 
if we adopt an evolutionary perspective. 
In fact, as we have seen, even if the trained performances cannot be 
reached instinctively, nevertheless the justification of the validity of any 
single inferential step we make in such performances rests, in ultimate 
analysis, on our cognitive structures and biological constitution. 
Thus, to maintain a realist view is necessary to link evolution to the 
truth. For example, Wilkins and Griffiths state that to «defeat evolutionary 
skepticism, true belief must be linked to evolutionary success in such a way 
that selection will favour organisms which have true beliefs» (Wilkins and 
Griffiths, 2013, p. 134). The problem is exactly how to justify such a link. 
In fact, even if we follow Dutilh Novaes in her distinction between an 
“immanent” and a “transcendent” approach to the justification of formal 
languages (Dutilh Novaes, 2012, § 7.1.3.), i.e. if we distinguish between 
the way of justifying “pure” and “applied” logic (for the former relying on 
some internal criterion, e.g. coherence; for the latter relying on some 
measure of the success of its application), we cannot in any case 
demonstrate to be able to justify our inferential moves independently of our 
constitution thanks to our trained ability. 
On the one hand, we cannot immanently justify the choice of our 
axioms for immanent reasons: 
 
The mathematician gives a proof of a result by deriving it from other results 
already proved. They were proved by deriving them from other results already 
proved, and so on. Since mathematicians assume that this process must ultimately 
come to an end, the question then arises: How do mathematicians justify their 
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ultimate starting points? They cannot justify them by showing that they are true – 
in any sense of “true”, including the weak sense of “being consistent” – because 
this is impossible by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem (Cellucci, 
forthcoming, pp. 14-15)
2
. 
 
On the other hand, if we refer to a transcendent approach, we can just 
refer to the empirical success of our formal languages: 
 
the most pressing question for an account of how formal, technical frameworks 
can be applied to investigate informal, nontechnical concepts and theories then 
becomes: how do the two realms “latch on” to each other? (…). But skepticism 
concerning the epistemic power of formal modeling is put under pressure by the 
sheer amount of successful cases of genuine novel knowledge (...) produced by 
means of formal modeling (Dutilh Novaes, 2012, p. 233). 
 
But supporting the claim that if our reasoning is successful, our beliefs 
have to be true, amounts just to “assume” that “only the truth leads to 
success”: it is not a justification neither of such assumption, nor of the 
inferences we perform in order to achieve success. 
b) There is the epistemological difficulty of using the cultural 
sophisticated outputs of those cognitive abilities which should naturalize 
our cultural achievements in the very definition of the objects whose 
production we would like to explain. For example, Núñez states that: 
 
A major problem in most accounts of the concept of number is that scholars 
often introduce crucial elements of the explanans in the very explanandum. That is, 
they take number systems as pre-given and introduce them as a part of the 
explanatory proposal itself (…). Gallistel et al. (2006:247), for instance, speak of 
“mental magnitudes” referring to a “real number system in the brain”, where the 
very real numbers are taken for granted, and put them “in the brain”. But, we must 
not forget that the system of real numbers is an extremely sophisticated concept 
(...), shaped historically over centuries (...). How could such a number system be 
simply “in the brain”? (Núñez, 2006, p. 71). 
 
This problem is analogous to that of using a logical theory in evaluating 
the individual reasoning performances while claiming that such a theory 
gives us the truths about such domain. There seems to be no independent-
from-success way to define what the “truth” is, while the realists in 
 
2 Indeed, by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem «for any consistent, sufficiently 
strong deductive theory T, the sentence canonically expressing the consistency of T, Con(T), 
is undemonstrable in T» (Cellucci, 2013a, p. 4). 
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supporting their view need to justify the claim that only the truth can lead 
to success. We will now analyze such difficulty in relation to mathematics. 
 
 
3. Naturalizing Mathematics 
 
Is it possible to naturalize the human ability to grasp mathematics, in 
order to secure a realist view of science and mathematics and make it 
compatible with Naturalism? Some authors have tried to naturalize 
mathematics and explain naturalistically its applicability relying on 
evolutionism (De Cruz, 2007, 2006; Krebs, 2011). 
The distance between an evolutionary account of mathematics and a 
platonist one is due to the radically different view of the nature of 
mathematics they adopt: «The most important corollary of adopting a 
universal selection theory to mathematics is that the history of mathematics 
is not the unfolding of eternal mathematical truths, but an evolutionary 
contingent process (…) a Darwinian approach may be able to dispel the 
essentialism that is still rampant in the philosophy of mathematics» (De 
Cruz, 2007, p. 281). In such a view mathematical objects cannot be thought 
as mind-independent objects as MP claims: 
 
If we take the idea that cultural objects, (...), are contingent products of 
evolution, adopting such an essentialist position for mathematics is both 
unjustifiable and untenable. The upshot of a Darwinian approach is that, if we take 
a modified version of Gould’s (1989) thought experiment (…), namely rewinding 
the tape of the history of mathematics, we would quite likely end up with a 
mathematics that is different from the one we have today (De Cruz, 2007, p. 282). 
 
So, a Darwinian approach to mathematics is thought to consent to the 
realist to block the IA while maintaining SR: 
 
An evolutionary approach makes the indispensability argument dispensable. 
Since basic mathematical constructions in the animal and human mind are the 
product of evolution by natural selection, they must somehow have promoted the 
survival and reproductive success of the ancestors of those organisms. This is only 
likely if there is some correspondence between those innate cognitive domains (...) 
and the physical world. Thus, mathematics can be considered a reliable tool to 
describe scientific phenomena – even if it has no existence outside the animal or 
human brain (De Cruz, 2004, pp. 80-81). 
 
Combining selectionism and functionalism in order to naturalize realism 
may seem a coherent strategy: «the proper function of some mechanism, 
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trait, or process in evolved organisms is ultimately relative to fitness, and 
the brain has as proper function the production of beliefs that are fitness-
enhancing» (De Cruz and De Smedt, 2012, p. 413). But this is not 
sufficient. Another step is necessary to achieve such goal: «the evolutionary 
argument (…) contends that natural selection will form animal brains that 
tend to produce true beliefs, because true beliefs are essential for adaptive 
decision making» (Ibidem, pp. 416-417). So, in order to naturalize realism, 
to produce beliefs that are “fitness-enhancing” has to mean to produce 
“true” beliefs.  
There is a deep relationship between the evolved structure of the human 
brain and scientific knowledge. In fact, «from an evolutionary perspective, 
science is a recent development in our species. Thus, scientists have to 
draw on the same cognitive resources as other people, and they are subject 
to the same cognitive limitations» (De Cruz, 2011, p. 205). So, those 
cognitive resources have to be able to produce true beliefs in order to give 
us humans the ability to produce true scientific theories.  
This view raises at least two main problems. 
1) The first problem is that if the beliefs produced by humans have to be 
true in order to be fitness-enhancing, and mathematics is produced by 
humans because it has been fitness-enhancing, thus mathematics has to be 
true; and given that mathematics is fitness-enhancing, i.e. true, because 
«there is some correspondence between those innate cognitive domains 
(…) and the physical world», it seems to be fair to claim that De Cruz is 
adopting a correspondence theory of truth. In such a way, mathematics is 
applicable to the world because it corresponds to the world.  
But how can we affirm a correspondence between mathematics and the 
world? This is a debated issue, because if we try to claim for a 
correspondence between mathematics and the world referring, as many 
realists do, to the Tarskian concept of truth, we have to face the well known 
objection that this kind of tool is adequate just to state the correspondence 
between a bit of language and a bit of metalanguage, and not between a bit 
of language and the world (e.g. Bunge, 2012).  
Indeed, the correspondence relation may be formalized in Tarskian 
terms because it is possible to determine that an isomorphism obtains 
between two mathematical structures. If we try to adopt this line of 
reasoning we should admit that the world is a mathematical structure. In 
fact, an isomorphism can only obtain between two mathematical structures 
(Halvorson, 2012, p. 185), and if an isomorphism is claimed to obtain 
between mathematics and the world, the world has to be considered a 
mathematical structure. For example, Tegmark states that from «the 
definition of a mathematical structure (…), it follows that if there is an 
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isomorphism between a mathematical structure and another structure (…), 
then they are one and the same. If our external physical reality is 
isomorphic to a mathematical structure, it therefore fits the definition of 
being a mathematical structure» (Tegmark, 2008, p. 107). But this is 
obviously a sort of Platonism, more precisely of Pythagoreanism, which is 
at odds with the naturalistic stance De Cruz is arguing for (Steiner, 1998). 
2) The second problem is the justification of the “realist core” of this 
view: the crucial premise of such adaptationist view is in fact that “only 
true beliefs can be useful”. Stich has sketched this position as follows: «the 
argument seems to be that natural selection favors true beliefs, (…). So if 
an organism is the product of natural selection, we can safely assume that 
most of its beliefs will be true» (Stich, 2011, p. 83).  
The problem is that if we commit ourselves to claim that human 
cognitive structures are true beliefs producers because they have been 
selected for, then we should be able to demonstrate that every cognitive 
adaptation is able to produce nothing else than (or at least mostly) true 
beliefs. But this is not an easy task, because, as Stich, among others, has 
stressed, «it is simply not the case that natural selection favors true beliefs 
over false ones. What natural selection does favor is beliefs which yield 
selective advantage. And there are many environmental circumstances in 
which false beliefs will be more useful than true ones» (Ibidem).  
The problem of connecting selection and truth is analogous to that of 
linking the truth of a theory to its empirical success. As the success cannot 
guarantee the inference to the truth of its (hypothesized) cause, so the 
survival is not able to discriminate among its possible causes. So both 
success and survival are not reliable indicators of truth (Wray, 2013). The 
realists face a dilemma: either they reduce their explanation to a vacuous 
tautology, or accept that success is caused not only by true beliefs, but this 
would amount to dismiss realism.  
The only way to maintain an evolutionary realist perspective, and secure 
that success is implied only by true beliefs, is to presuppose such a realist 
connection (Sage, 2004). For example, Millikan states: 
 
“Assuming that” the capacity to form and to use beliefs has survival value 
mainly in so far as the beliefs formed are true (…), and “assuming that” humans 
currently have this capacity in part because, historically, having it had survival 
value, the mechanisms in us that produce beliefs, (…) all have in common at least 
one proper function: helping to produce true beliefs (Millikan, 1984, p. 317, 
emphasis mine). 
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3.1. The Self-Defeating Objection 
 
It has been objected that a position like that of Stich (call it: the 
Debunking Position, DP) is self-defeating, in the sense that DP denies that 
natural selection favors true beliefs, thus that the correspondence view of 
truth can be justified through evolution, and so that science can be justified, 
while DP itself adopts that very same concept of truth in scientifically 
stating that in some evolutionary contexts “false” beliefs are more useful 
than “true” ones. For example, De Cruz states that: 
 
This line of reasoning is self-defeating. Evolutionary accounts according to 
which human cognitive capacities are so deeply biased and defective that 
knowledge is ruled out are self-undermining. There would be no good reason to 
assume that scientific theories are justified, or that philosophical reflection and 
argumentation (…) provides us with sound conceptual knowledge (De Cruz et al. 
2011, p. 525). 
 
But this objection is inadequate. In fact, it does not give a real defence 
of the realist position (call it: the Evolutionary Position, EP). But such 
objection helps us to underline the difficulties that affect both DP and EP, 
difficulties which derive from the conception of knowledge that both DP 
and EP adopt. 
Indeed, DP per se does not deny the correspondence view of truth, nor 
that science aims at or obtains truth, it just says that natural selection cannot 
account for the truth of the beliefs that humans produce. In fact, DP can be 
stated starting from a realist point of view: scientific theories are true, so it 
is possible to discriminate between true and false beliefs, and science says 
that false beliefs are in some evolutionary contexts more useful than true 
ones. Thus DP just affirms that it is true that science says that natural 
selection cannot account for the truth of human beliefs, and just denies the 
assumption that “only true beliefs can be adaptive”. So, since DP does not 
deny the possibility of discriminating true beliefs from false beliefs, and its 
conclusions do not contradict any of its premises, DP is not self-defeating, 
and the above objection is inadequate. 
DP would be self-defeating only if the evolutionary strategy adopted by  
EP would be the only acceptable means to establish a criterion of truth, i.e. 
a tool to tell the true from the false (Cellucci, 2014). If such premise is 
assumed, than denying the possibility that selection gives us a true beliefs 
producer system would amount to deny that it is possible to have a criterion 
of truth, and so that it is not possible to discriminate between true beliefs 
and false beliefs. In such case DP would be self-defeating. 
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But there is no evident reason why such premise should be accepted by 
those who advocate for DP. In fact, it is not clear how could a realist 
demonstrate that the evolutionary strategy is the only acceptable one. In 
giving such a demonstration she should either use 1) an evolutionarily 
established criterion of truth, or 2) a non-evolutionarily established 
criterion of truth. Both cases are problematic. In fact, if the realist uses 1), 
she adopts as established a criterion which is still under examination, given 
that the evolutionary strategy to establish a criterion of truth is exactly what 
is contested, so this option would amount to a sort of petitio principii; if the 
realist uses 2) this would lead to a self-defeating argument, because if the 
demonstration of the uniqueness of the evolutionary strategy to establish a 
criterion of truth rests on a non-evolutionarily established criterion of truth, 
this very fact undermines the claim of uniqueness that should be 
demonstrated. 
What can be conceded is just that DP shares the same problem of its 
opponent EP, i.e. that of giving a criterion of truth. But, given that this is a 
problem for both the positions at issue, it seems unfair for EP to move a 
criticism to DP based on such problem. 
In fact, even EP should give a criterion of truth independent from the 
survival in order to justify the claim that natural selection favours true 
beliefs over false ones without reducing such claim to a tautology (Downes, 
2000). In other words, EP needs a criterion of truth other than the survival 
in order to identify which beliefs are true among the set of beliefs made up 
by natural selection. If instead the beliefs that are true are defined as those 
beliefs which have been selected, then we have just a tautology, and we 
cannot really claim that natural selection has favoured true beliefs over 
false ones, because this conclusion would just be implicit in our definition 
of “true beliefs” in terms of “selected beliefs”3. 
Finally, if it would be demonstrated that the survival is the only 
available evolutionarily established criterion of truth, the fact that EP needs 
a criterion of truth other than the survival would imply that EP cannot be 
but self-defeating (see point 2) above). 
So, EP cannot fairly accuse DP of being self-defeating, given that EP is 
in a similar (if not worst) situation: to secure its criterion should rely on 
some other criterion. So, if it is not possible to rely on some criterion 
different from the evolutionary one, than both EP and DP fall, given that 
 
3 If EP adopts such “tautological strategy”, it can affirm to have not to give a criterion 
of truth, and that the selected beliefs are true. But this amounts to claim that false beliefs 
cannot exist. If this would be the case the problem arises of how to account for: 1) our 
misbeliefs; 2) the fact that the history of science shows us that the scientifically produced 
beliefs change over time. 
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the latter would be self-defeating, while the former would be impossible 
even to be substantially formulated. If instead it is assumed that it is 
possible to rely on some different criterion, then DP is not unfairly 
formulated, nor self-defeating, while EP risks to be self-defeating. 
There is at least an impasse here. Analyzing the inadequacy of the 
objection of being self-defeating moved to DP shows that the conception of 
knowledge on which both EP and DP rests is unsatisfying, because it is 
exactly that conception which leads to the impasse described above. 
Indeed, it is important to remind that they may be both considered two 
realist positions. In fact, the problem in both cases rests on the realist’s 
side: either she cannot accuse DP of being self-defeating, and thus cannot 
defend her own attempt to naturalize truth, or she falls together with DP. 
On the contrary, discarding DP as self-defeating is not a problem for an 
anti-realist position which denies that knowledge is related to the concept 
of truth, such that, e.g., proposed by Cellucci (forthcoming, 2014, 2013a). 
 
 
4. Naturalizing Knowledge  
 
Despite the difficulties it implies, the traditional account of knowledge 
as “justified true belief” seems to resist in wanting of a better proposal, 
which seems not easy to be found (Lycan, 2006). For example, Nozick 
states that, if asked what knowledge is, a «reasonable philosopher today 
might say that, in view of the difficulties thus far encountered, he just does 
not know» (Nozick, 1995, p.146). Notwithstanding, many realists continue 
to subscribe to (some formulation of) the traditional correspondence view 
of truth and to the traditional view of knowledge (Sankey, 2008).  
We will briefly analyze two realist attempts to naturalizing knowledge 
made by Kornblith (2002) and Plotkin (1997), to show that these attempts 
completely rest on such traditional view, and that, for this reason, they are 
unsatisfying for a naturalist. 
Referring to Nozick’s work, it will be argued that the confidence in the 
fact that only the truth leads to success rests on a sort of “intuition”, which 
cannot be naturalistically justified, but which can instead be evolutionarily 
explained. 
 
 
4.1. Kornblith and Plotkin  
 
Kornblith tries to naturalize knowledge by claiming that knowledge is a 
natural kind. He takes «natural kinds to be homeostatically clustered 
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properties, properties that are mutually supporting and reinforcing in the 
face of external change» (Kornblith, 2002, p. 61). 
The problem of this position lays in the notion of truth on which it relies 
to define what a natural kind is. In fact, Kornblith tries to connect truth and 
success relying on Darwinism:  
 
If we wish to explain why it is that members of a species have survived, we 
need to appeal to the causal role of the animals’ knowledge of their environment in 
producing behavior which allows them to succeed in fulfilling their biological 
needs. (…). The knowledge that members of a species embody is the locus of a 
homeostatic cluster of properties: true beliefs that are reliably produced, that are 
instrumental in the production of behavior successful in meeting biological needs 
and thereby implicated in the (...) selective retention of traits (Ibidem, p. 62). 
 
This amounts to say that knowledge is useful in achieving successful 
behaviors because it is a natural kind, and natural kinds are such that 
consent to fulfill animal’s biological goals because in some way they 
“carve nature at its joints”. 
Thus, the concept of knowledge maintained by Kornblith is equivalent 
to the classical one: knowledge is reliable produced true beliefs. But how 
can we support the idea that science can know the natural kinds?  
The only way to support such claim is to accept the traditional view of 
truth. In defining “natural kinds” in the way Kornblith does, the idea of a 
necessary correspondence between our knowledge and the world is just 
reaffirmed, but not demonstrated to be necessary. 
Kornblith tries to support his view in the same way the realists support 
SR, i.e. abductively: «we are committed to the existence of knowledge 
because (...) knowledge plays an explanatory role in our theories. We are 
thus committed to the existence of knowledge, on this view, for the same 
kinds of reasons that we are committed to the existence of quarks and 
quasars (…). Knowledge is a feature of the world» (Ibidem, p. 159). 
The problem is that even if we concede that we should commit 
ourselves to the existence of knowledge, given the role it indispensably 
plays in our explanations, this does not by itself guarantees that the features 
we traditionally attribute to knowledge, i.e. the way we say that knowledge 
is, correctly corresponds to what knowledge really is. 
We have here the same problem which is at the core of the debate over 
SR: are we justified in claiming that the world is exactly the way we say it 
is, because those concepts we use to describe the way the world is figure in 
our best scientific explanation? 
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We could be justified in making such claim only if we could justify the 
claim that only the truth (as correspondence) implies success. But realism 
merely assumes such claim, it does not justify it. 
Plotkin states that «what one knows corresponds to something 
happening in the world» (Plotkin, 1997, p. 7). Thus, he seems to adopt the 
traditional correspondence view to account for what knowledge is. Plotkin 
naturalizes this view of knowledge relying on an adaptationist view of 
evolutionism. In fact, he says that evolutionary theory is a theory of 
knowledge because evolution explains adaptations, knowledge «is a special 
kind of adaptation. And all adaptations are knowledge» (Ibidem, p. 228). In 
fact, since evolution «leads (…) to the thoughts and ideas that we have in 
our heads», and knowledge may be thought of as a «relationship between 
the organization of the brain and specific features of order in the world 
outside» (Ibidem, pp. 20-21), we should infer that those adaptations which 
consent our knowledge give us the ability to mirror the way the world is.    
Thus Plotkin claims that since adaptations and knowledge are successful 
they have to be true. This view is obviously based on the assumptions that 
“only the truth can lead to success”, that truth is correspondence, and that 
truth is necessary to have knowledge. But there is nothing in Plotkin’s 
argument which justifies such assumptions, except the asserted 
impossibility of conceiving otherwise the explanation of our success.  
Plotkin also acknowledges that there is a difficulty in justifying 
knowledge relying on evolutionism. In fact, organisms are not made only 
by adaptations, they are «bundles of organized features», only some of 
which are «good adaptations» (Ibidem, p. 228). What is possible to assess 
is just the whole organism’s success in surviving. Fitness is a way of 
measuring such success. But fitness is a “statistical abstraction”, in the 
sense that if an organism survives, it is not possible to assess whether its 
survival is due to the fact that a specific adaptation correctly corresponds to 
the world or not. The situation is analogous to that we have in the debate on 
the confirmation of scientific theories. We cannot judge of any individual 
claim in a theory, because confirmation holistically supports the whole 
theory, so we cannot know if any claim of the theory is true, even if we 
think that confirmation is a guide to truth: one «may not always be certain 
as to whether in any one case survival is contributed to by knowledge or 
whether we are just fooled into thinking that this particular organism has 
good knowledge because it survives» (Ibidem, p. 232). 
Thus, «having “incorrect” or false knowledge, does not mean that the 
individual will fail to survive and reproduce» (Ibidem, p. 233). Moreover, 
the difficulty of linking truth and survival is not a problem of degree, 
because even «if it were only very rarely untrue, but the holders of the 
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untruths survived and reproduced, that would be enough to nullify any 
foolish claim by evolutionary epistemology to overcoming the justification 
problem», i.e. to support the claim that success is a good indicator of truth. 
In fact, only «if survival and reproduction are absolutely correlated with 
knowledge could they be an infallible guide to true belief», but Plotkin 
maintains that «this is not the case» (Ibidem, p. 234). Thus we cannot safely 
rely on the success of some organism to assess the truth of such organism’s 
knowledge. 
Plotkin tries to overcome such problem through an abductive defence of 
SR. Put it briefly, his argument runs like follows: knowledge is necessary 
to survive; knowledge is «correspondence to the things-in-themselves» 
(Ibidem, p. 240); if we could not have knowledge of the way the world is, 
we could not have survived; we survived; thus we have knowledge of the 
way the world is. He thinks that the fact «that we survive at all is proof that 
knowledge is possible» (Ibidem, p. 240), and that this means that 
“Kantianism” has to be incorrect: «if Kant were correct, if living things 
could never know the things-in-themselves, then life would never survive 
(…). Since we and the myriad other forms of life do survive, Kant must be 
wrong» (Ibidem, p. 241). 
But the fact that knowledge is possible defeats “Kantianism” only if we 
accept that knowledge cannot be anything but “correspondence to things-
in-themselves”. But why should we accept such premise? We should do 
that only if we accept the idea that only the truth as correspondence can 
lead to success. But how could we support such a claim? If we rely on 
survival we have to face the fact that Plotkin himself has underlined: 
survival cannot justify our claim that only the truth can lead to success, 
because not only the truth leads to survival.  
Moreover, Plotkin’s argument seems to be based on a sort of ambiguity. 
He often says that organisms have to successfully relate to their 
environment in order to survive. But saying that knowledge is “knowledge 
of things-in-themselves” and that “truth is correspondence” is far stronger 
than merely claiming that living beings have to “successfully” relate to 
their environment, or “match” with it. If we do not qualify “match” as 
“correspondence up to isomorphism”, then such a claim is inadequate to 
define a scientific realist position, because it could be compatible with 
different, and broadly speaking anti-realist, positions (e.g. instrumentalism, 
pragmatism, skepticism, etc.) which deny that our knowledge corresponds 
to the way the world is independently of us (Unger, 1971; Cellucci, 2014; 
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Stanford, 2006)
4
. But if we try to defend the claim that knowledge is 
“correspondence up to isomorphism”, we have to face the well known 
difficulty of showing how it is possible to assess if the correspondence 
between our knowledge and the world actually occurs. It seems that we 
cannot do that but indirectly relying on success. But in this way we come 
again to the problem that success is not a good indicator of truth. 
Kornblith’s and Plotkin’s way of naturalizing knowledge seems more a 
way of securing the realist conception of knowledge, than a way to propose 
a truly new way of conceiving of knowledge reflecting on the way in which 
science proceeds. 
 
 
4.2. Nozick and Evolution 
 
Nozick (2001, 1993) takes into account evolution to assess the 
traditional claims on what knowledge is. His work allows us to assess the 
two different but related aspects of the scientific theorizing which underpin 
the traditional views of knowledge and truth that we have already seen 
above in relation to the attempt to justifying our inferences: 1) some 
statements appear to us as self-evident; 2) the theory derived from such 
statements are successful. The combination of these two aspects seems to 
support the claim that scientific theories are able at attaining the truth. 
Think about mathematics: we have no other way to justify our 
confidence in the truth of the axioms of our theories than relying on the fact 
that they seem to be evident to us (or to the community of mathematicians). 
A sort of confirmation of our ability in “seeing” their being self-evidently 
true is claimed to derive from the empirical success of our scientific 
theories which indispensably rely on mathematics, which at its turn rests on 
such self-evident axioms. Thus, such axioms have to be true. 
But if we accept a naturalist stance, then we have to accept to conceive 
of humans and human understanding as natural facts, and so that the 
justifications of our beliefs have to be evaluated in the same way in which 
we evaluate the behaviour of all other living beings, i.e. referring to 
evolution. 
 
4 This is the problem of a sort of “double standard” that many realists seem to adopt: 
when they refer to scientific theories and mathematical models they define “truth” in the 
rigorous Tarskian terms of “correspondence up to isomorphism”, while when they try to root 
human epistemic ability in attaining the truth in evolution, they seem to content themselves 
with a definition of “truth” in terms of “sufficiently good to survival”. But the two 
conceptions of truth are clearly not equivalent (Downes, 2000). Thus, the realists cannot 
naturalize and justify the former relying on the latter. 
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So, if we analyse the first aspect mentioned above (“some statements 
appear to us as self-evident”) from an evolutionary stance, what at most we 
can conclude is that the ability in judging something as self-evident may 
have been selected for because of its usefulness in some relevant contexts 
of our evolutionary past. 
But this leave us with two problems: a) the problem of induction: even 
if in the past what we now perceive as self-evident has been useful, this 
does not mean that it will continue to be so; b) the fact that in the past what 
we now perceive as self-evident has been useful does not guarantee that it 
ever was, strictly, true. 
These are the key points of Nozick’s rebuttal of the idea that there are 
metaphysical necessities: if we accept evolutionism we cannot state neither 
if what appears to us as self-evident and necessary is instead contingent, 
nor if it is even true. This position clearly debunks some traditional claims 
on what knowledge and truth are. 
Nozick gives as an example of this second problem (“that something has 
been useful in the past does not guarantee that it ever was, strictly, true”) 
the Euclidean geometry intended as a theory of the physical space: indeed, 
even if since antiquity to the 19
th
 century no one conceived the possibility 
that the physical space could not be Euclidean (Kragh, 2012), today we 
think that Euclidean geometry «is true enough for almost all practical 
purposes; (…) but, strictly, it is not true» (Nozick, 1993, p. 109). This fact 
could be due to the selective advantage we had in perceiving the physical 
space as Euclidean, and this very fact could explain our tendency to 
perceive the Euclidean geometry as self-evidently true. 
It is important to clarify that, from a scientific realist point of view, the 
only acceptable use of “true” is Nozick’s “strictly true”, i.e. “true because it 
corresponds up to isomorphism to the mind-independent world”, while 
Nozick’s “true enough” is clearly so vague, contextual, and pragmatically 
defined that could not fit with the non-epistemic view of truth the majority 
of the realists advocates (Sankey, 2008). 
Euclidean geometry is used as an example of a useful-but-false belief 
that the cognitive structures instilled in us by the evolution could let us 
think to be true also by Peirce
5
. But if this were the case, why we should 
think that our present theory could not be in the same situation in which the 
 
5 Cf., e.g., Peirce (CP 6.29): «It is true that according to the axioms of geometry the 
sum of the three sides of a triangle are precisely 180°; (…). They are expressions of our 
inborn conception of space, and as such are entitled to credit, so far as their truth could have 
influenced the formation of the mind. But that affords not the slightest reason for supposing 
them exact». Peirce is considered to be the first philosopher to claim that Euclidean 
geometry “cannot” be the geometry of the physical space (Dipert, 1977; Kragh, 2012). 
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Euclidean geometry was? The fact that Euclidean geometry is “false” may 
in fact be asserted from the point of view we reached after the elaboration 
of non-Euclidean geometries. This development in mathematics has 
affected both the above mentioned aspects we are dealing with: 1) the very 
fact that finally alternatives geometries were conceived and shown to be 
coherent and that physical theories based on such alternative geometries 
have also been conceived, speaks against the claim that what we take to be 
unconceivable at some time will be such forever. Thus, we should refrain 
from claiming that our present theory is true because we cannot conceive 
(or find) an alternative to it; 2) we claim that Euclidean geometry is not 
really true as a theory of the physical space not only because a different 
geometry may be coherently elaborated, but because such new geometry 
has been used in some fundamental physical theory, which is empirically 
more successful than the physical theory based on the Euclidean geometry. 
Thus, the fact that some statements appear to us as self-evidently true is 
not by itself a guarantee of their truth, if our ability in evaluating the self-
evident truth of a statement is an evolved capacity. Our “sense” of the self-
evident may be not only oriented towards contingent connections which 
were useful in the past and that do not reflect necessary and eternal truths, 
but given that we are not able to demonstrate that only the truth leads to 
success, we cannot eliminate the possibility that an ability in perceiving as 
self-evident some falsities has been selected because of the usefulness 
deriving from perceiving such falsities as self-evident truths. 
Now we come to the second aspect mentioned above (“the theory 
derived from such statements are successful”). Here it seems that there 
could be a line of defence for the traditional view: in fact, the argument 
goes, “how could be possible” that empirically successful theories derive 
from false self-evident statements? The combination of the two aspects 
seems to be the key: some false-but-useful statements may be mistakenly 
taken for true ones, but the fact that the theories elaborated starting from 
some statements bring us at attaining strong empirical success must mean 
that we reached the truth. 
But let’s analyse this second aspect having in mind the evolutionary 
perspective we illustrated above: what we can safely say is just that we 
have successful theories, or that a theory is more successful than some 
previous or alternative one. This is not at odds with the fact that the 
statements from which we derive the theories may not be true. In fact, we 
have not been able to establish that only true statements may lead to 
successful theories. The fact that a theory is successful should imply that its 
fundamental “axioms” are true only if it is the case that only the truth leads 
to success. But, as already noted above, there is not such a direct link 
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between success and truth (or at least it is not easy to demonstrate that this 
link obtains relying on evolutionism). 
Obviously our ability in coping with the world and in elaborating 
theories which are more successful than the previous ones is something that 
we have to try to explain. The point is assessing if the traditional proposed 
solution is satisfying. Indeed, traditionally, what has been proposed as an 
explanation of our success is that our theories are true, and that truth is 
correspondence. But from an evolutionary perspective this hypothesis is 
equivalent to one of the statements that we judge as self-evident. How 
could we evaluate such hypothesis? If we rely on our “sense for self-
evident truths”, we will not be able to say if our intuition of what truth is is 
really true according to our view of truth or if it just belongs to that kind of 
statements which has been useful to judge as self-evident even if they are 
“strictly” false. On the other hand, if we rely on the fact that our theories 
are successful to support the claim that they have to be true, we have to 
face the fact that if we try to propose the truth as an explanation for the 
success of our theories we should support and explain what truth is 
independently of success. Indeed, we cannot presuppose exactly that link 
between success and truth that we should instead support. 
Most of the time, in supporting their claims, realists appeal to the fact 
that “it would be impossible to conceive” a different way to account for the 
success of our theories other than referring to the truth (Kitcher, 1978). But 
how could we support the idea that our ability in conceiving alternative 
explanations and in judging what is impossible to conceive is reliable? If 
we want to take naturalism seriously, we have to refer to evolutionism. 
Thus, we come again to the objection that we have seen above relative to 
the reliability of our innate ability in perceiving what is necessary or 
possible. 
Thus, we have to face the possibility that accepting an evolutionary 
stance would mean not only that even if a concept of truth seems self-
evident to us it may nevertheless be false, but also that the fact that it seems 
impossible to us to conceive an alternative to a concept may not be a 
reliable way to assess the truth of the impossibility to conceive an 
alternative to such concept, nor a reliable way to confirm the truth of such 
concept. So, neither the appealing to our “intuition”, nor the appealing to 
the “empirical success”, seems able to justify the traditional realist 
conception of knowledge. 
The fact is that we cannot reach an Archimedean point of view and 
assess if our hypothesis that “only truth can explain success” is true. We 
can only rely on success. And we can safely comparatively measure 
success. But does this make the hypothesis (i.e. the truth of our theories) 
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that we proposed to explain the success of our theories more confirmed? 
The answer is in the negative. The point is that it is easy to mistake an 
increase in the success for an increase in the confirmation of the hypothesis 
that it is the truth which explains our success, exactly because we tend to 
implicitly assume that it is only the truth that leads to success. But as many 
other implicit assumptions we make, and notwithstanding how much this 
assumption about the truth seems evident to us, such assumption may be 
unreliable. 
 
 
4.3. The Inadequacy of the Traditional View of Knowledge 
 
What we have said makes explicit the need to elaborate and adopt a 
different view of knowledge, in order to support a naturalistic stance. For 
example, Cellucci (forthcoming, 2014, 2013a), following Kant, argues for 
the inadequacy of the traditional view of knowledge for a naturalist. In fact, 
if knowledge is justified true belief, and truth is correspondence, then it is 
not possible to assess if knowledge has been reached, because it is not 
possible to confront our knowledge to the things-in-themselves, thus 
knowledge is impossible for us, it is beyond human reach; but given that 
knowledge is necessary to survive, and that we indeed survived, knowledge 
must be possible; thus we have to conclude that knowledge is not 
correspondence. 
What has to be underlined here is that the realists and the skeptics share 
the same conception of knowledge. They just draw different conclusions, 
because they adopt different secondary premises. Indeed the realist argues 
that: knowledge is justified true beliefs, thus truth is necessary for 
knowledge; we do have knowledge; this means that we can attain the truth. 
On the contrary the skeptic argues that: knowledge is justified true beliefs, 
thus truth is necessary for knowledge; we cannot attain the truth; this means 
that we cannot have knowledge (Unger, 1971). 
A naturalist position as the one advocated here shares with the realist the 
conviction that we do have knowledge and that knowledge is necessary to 
survive, while shares with the skeptic the conviction that we cannot reach 
knowledge if knowledge is justified true beliefs. But from such premises 
draws the conclusion that it is incorrect to define knowledge in the 
traditional way, and that the intuition that knowledge can be nothing but 
justified true beliefs is ungrounded. 
Another option that shares the realist’s and the skeptic’s main premise is 
anti-naturalism (Plantinga, 2006). The anti-naturalist argues that: 
knowledge is justified true beliefs, thus truth is necessary for knowledge; if 
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we accept naturalism we have to deny that it is possible to reach the truth; 
but given that we do have knowledge, this means that we have to reject 
naturalism. Moreover, naturalism would be self-defeating: how could it 
justify its own claim to be the true view if it leads to the conclusion that it 
is impossible to attain the truth? Anti-naturalism is obviously entirely based 
on the assumption that knowledge has to be related to the truth. In this case 
Naturalism would be self-defeating. But it is not clear at all why we should 
accept such premise on what knowledge is. 
The realist attempts to naturalize the traditional view seem not 
compelling. Indeed we have no satisfying definition of the traditional 
concept of knowledge (Lycan, 2006), nor a really satisfying definition of 
the concept of truth and a related definition of a workable criterion of truth 
(Cellucci, 2014). Thus it is not even clear “what” we should accept and 
“why”. 
  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
It has been argued for the necessity of rethinking the concept of 
knowledge and decoupling it from the concept of truth in order to elaborate 
and support a naturalistic stance, which could take Darwin, and science 
more generally, seriously. 
Briefly, we have tried to show that if mathematics does not depend on 
our biological make-up, mathematics may be considered not to be 
contingent, but then the problem arises of how we can attain mathematical 
truths. With regard to the formalization of Darwinism, this means that we 
could safely assume that the formalization leads to a more secure 
foundation of Darwinism, but we would not be able to naturalistically 
account for this very fact. 
If, on the contrary, mathematics depends on our biological make-up, 
then we cannot take mathematical knowledge to be certain, in the sense that 
it may be contingent, but we can try to give a naturalistic account of our 
ability in producing mathematics. With regard to the naturalization of 
mathematics, this means that even the very theory we take for granted in 
order to naturalize mathematics, i.e. Darwinism, cannot be taken for 
certain, in the sense that it could not be considered securely founded even if 
a complete formalization of it could be given. 
We cannot maintain both certainty and naturalism. But this does not 
mean that we cannot have knowledge, and in fact we do have knowledge. 
This just means that we should accept to modify our view of what 
knowledge is. 
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